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JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge: 
Pro se plaintiff Lisa Zaltz (“plaintiff” or 
“Zaltz”) brought this action for breach of 
contract, personal injury, and fraud against 
JDATE (“defendant” or “Sparks 
Networks”).1 Specifically, plaintiff alleges, 
among other things, that defendant billed her 
repeatedly for months without her 
knowledge or consent. Plaintiff claims that, 
despite her complaints about the fees, the 
problem was not remedied. Plaintiff also 
claims that she was eventually removed 
from the website altogether. Moreover, 
plaintiff alleges that she has received prank 
                                                     
1 Although plaintiff named JDATE as the defendant 
in the caption of this case, the proper defendant is 
Sparks Networks USA, LLC (“Sparks Networks”), 
the owner and operator of JDate.com, a popular 
dating website. Sparks Networks has appeared in this 
action, and filed the motion to dismiss or to transfer 
that is presently before the Court. The Court, 
therefore, directs the Clerk of the Court to modify the 
caption of this case accordingly.  
calls from the website, and that her personal 
page on the website has been hacked.  
Defendant has moved, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), to 
dismiss the action for improper venue or, in 
the alternative, to transfer the action, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),2 to the 
                                                     
2 In connection with its transfer motion, defendant 
cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406(a). Section 
1404(a) allows a court to transfer a case, even if the 
venue is proper, to any other district or division 
where it might have been brought “[f]or the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 
1406(a), on the other hand, permits a district court to 
transfer a case, “if it be in the interest of justice,” 
when the venue is improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
Thus, determining whether defendant’s transfer 
motion is more appropriately brought pursuant to 
Section 1404(a) or 1406(a) depends on whether 
venue in New York is proper or improper. “The 
presence of a forum selection clause does not enter 
into this analysis,” GMAC Commer. Credit v. Dillard 
Dep’t Stores, 198 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see 
also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
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28 n.8 (1988) (“Congress’ determination of where 
venue lies cannot be trumped by private contract and 
[], therefore, a forum selection clause cannot render 
venue improper in a district if venue is proper in that 
district under federal law.” (citation and quotation 
marks omitted)), “[r]ather, venue is determined by 
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391,” GMAC Commer. Credit, 
198 F.R.D. at 405. Section 1391 provides that a civil 
action may be brought in “(1) a judicial district in 
which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district is located; 
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred 
. . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action 
may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, 
any judicial district in which any defendant is subject 
to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to 
such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was 
improperly billed on a monthly basis, received prank 
phone calls, and was sexually assaulted on a date. 
(Compl.) Construing these allegations in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, a substantial part of the 
events that gave rise to plaintiff’s claims in this 
lawsuit occurred in the Eastern District of New York 
(as plaintiff is a resident of Lawrence, New York, and 
therefore received the bills, the calls, and went on the 
date where she was allegedly sexually assaulted in 
the area). See, e.g., Reyes v. Reyes, 11-CV-2536 
(KAM)(LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131659, at *17-
19 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2012) (stating that “venue 
may be appropriate in a given district even if a 
greater portion of events occurred elsewhere,” and 
concluding that when all inferences are construed in 
pro se plaintiff’s favor, she alleged facts sufficient to 
show that the district in which she filed bore a 
“substantial connection” to her litigation (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Daniel v. Am. 
Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 432 (2d Cir. 
2005) (explaining that venue is not restricted to the 
district in which the “most substantial” events or 
omissions giving rise to a claim occurred, but that 
venue can be appropriate in multiple jurisdictions, so 
long as a “substantial part” of the underlying events 
took place in those districts). Venue in this District 
would therefore be proper under Section 1391(b)(2).  
Even if a substantial part of the events giving 
rise to this lawsuit were not deemed to have occurred 
in this District, venue would be proper under Section 
1391(b)(3). Under the venue statute, when the 
defendant is a corporation, it “shall be deemed to 
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to 
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 
United States District Court for the Central 
District of California. For the reasons set 
forth below, the Court grants defendant’s 
motion to transfer and the action is 
transferred to the Central District of 
California. 
In particular, the Court finds that the 
contract at issue contained a presumptively 
enforceable forum selection clause wherein 
                                                                                
commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Thus, whether 
or not venue in this District is proper under Section 
1391(b)(3) depends on whether defendant was within 
this Court’s personal jurisdiction at the time the 
action was initiated. Courts in this District have held 
that websites like JDate.com – interactive websites 
that have a commercial component – can 
purposefully avail themselves of jurisdiction in a 
state when they make sales to customers in that state. 
Compare ICG Am., Inc. v. Wine of the Month Club, 
Inc., No. 3:09-cv-133(PCD), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77151, at *18-19 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2008) 
(“Defendant purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of doing business in Connecticut. Its 
interactive, commercial website invites consumers 
from any state, including Connecticut, to purchase its 
products.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and Nat’l Football League v. Miller, No. 
99 Civ. 11846 (JSM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3929, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (noting that mere 
maintenance of a website visited by people in New 
York does not confer personal jurisdiction in New 
York, but finding purposeful availment because 
website directly profited from plaintiffs in New 
York), with Capitol Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 
611 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(explaining that a defendant that “neither sells goods 
or services through its website nor charges 
membership fees to its registered users” does not 
conduct traditional business over the Internet for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction). Thus, because 
defendant charged membership fees to JDate.com to 
customers in New York, it can be said to have 
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing 
business in New York. Accordingly, venue here 
would be proper under Section 1391(b)(3) if not 
under Section 1391(b)(2). 
Because the Court concludes, without having 
considered the forum selection clause at issue, that 
venue would be proper in this District, the Court 
analyzes defendant’s transfer motion under Section 
1404(a). 
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the parties agreed to litigate any claims 
arising from defendant’s website in the State 
of California, City of Los Angeles. Although 
plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that 
she does not believe that she agreed to such 
a forum selection clause, the evidence 
suggests that she, in fact, did. A declaration 
filed by a Spark Networks employee, 
screenshots submitted by defendant, and 
JDate.com’s current website all demonstrate 
that plaintiff could not have signed up to 
participate on the site without agreeing to its 
terms and conditions, which included the 
California forum selection clause. Plaintiff 
has submitted no evidence to controvert 
these facts. By affirmatively accepting the 
terms and conditions of use, plaintiff agreed 
to be bound by all of the terms contained 
therein, including the forum selection 
clause, even if she did not take the time to 
read through the terms and conditions in 
their entirety before denoting her 
acceptance. Moreover, plaintiff does not 
allege any facts that would make the 
enforcement of that clause unreasonable or 
unjust, nor does she allege facts from which 
this Court could conclude that the clause is 
invalid. Accordingly, defendant’s California 
forum selection clause is valid and 
enforceable. 
In addition, the other discretionary 
factors courts consider in determining 
whether to transfer venue weigh strongly in 
favor of transfer in this case. For example, 
the locus of operative facts in this action lies 
within central California, and central 
California is the site of many of the 
documents and witnesses relevant to this 
case. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that litigating this case in 
California, as opposed to New York, would 
be inconvenient, or that she would be 
financially prejudiced by such a transfer.  
Because this action could have appropriately 
been brought in the Central District of 
California, a balancing of the relevant 
factors weighs in favor of transfer, and the 
interests of justice are served by transfer in 
these circumstances, the Court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, grants defendant’s 
motion to transfer this case.3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Complaint 
The complaint alleges that defendant, in 
connection with its website JDate.com, 
billed plaintiff repeatedly for months 
without her consent or knowledge. 
(Compl.)4 According to the complaint, 
plaintiff complained about the improper 
billing, but no changes were made. (Id.) 
Plaintiff claims that defendant instead 
“threw [her] off the site.” (Id.)  
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that she 
has “been receiving prank [and] sexual calls 
from the website.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 
she went to the police about those calls, but 
was told that the names of the callers could 
not be obtained. (Id.) The complaint further 
alleges that plaintiff was sexually assaulted 
by a member of the website while they were 
on a date, and that she has “experienced a lot 
of hacking” into her personal page on 
defendant’s website. (Id.) 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in New York 
State Supreme Court, Nassau County, on 
May 25, 2012. Defendant removed the case 
                                                     
3 As discussed in detail infra, because the Court, in its 
discretion, concludes that transfer is the appropriate 
remedy, the Court elects to transfer the case to the 
Central District of California pursuant to Section 
1404(a), rather than to dismiss the case pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4 Because plaintiff’s complaint is a single page, the 
Court refers to the complaint without page numbers. 
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to this Court on July 13, 2012. On August 
30, 2012, defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for improper 
venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the 
case to the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California. By Order 
dated November 28, 2012, the Court 
directed plaintiff to respond to defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff subsequently 
filed a letter in opposition to defendant’s 
motion, dated January 1, 2013. Defendant 
filed its reply in further support of its motion 
on January 17, 2013. The Court has fully 
considered the submissions of the parties. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Rule 12(b)(3) Motions 
Enforcement of a forum selection clause 
is an appropriate basis for a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc. 
(“TradeComet.com LLC II”), 647 F.3d 472, 
478 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 
12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has 
the burden of pleading venue. See Cold 
Spring Harbor Lab. v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 
762 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
If the court relies only on pleadings and 
affidavits, the plaintiff need only make a 
prima facie showing of venue. See Gulf Ins. 
Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d 
Cir. 2005). Thus, if an evidentiary hearing 
on the question of venue has not been held, 
“the Court accepts facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and draws all reasonable 
inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Person v. 
Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Caremark 
Therapeutic Servs. v. Leavitt, 405 F. Supp. 
2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The Court is 
permitted, however, to consider facts outside 
of the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion. 
See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc. 
(“TradeComet.com LLC I”), 693 F. Supp. 2d 
370, 375 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining 
that a court, in deciding a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(3), “may consider evidentiary matters 
outside the pleadings, by affidavit or 
otherwise, regarding the existence of 
jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
If there are disputed facts relevant to the 
venue determination, it may be appropriate 
for the district court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, where the plaintiff must 
demonstrate venue by a preponderance of 
the evidence, before resolving the Rule 
12(b)(3) motion. See New Moon Shipping 
Co., Ltd. v. MAN B&W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 
24, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A disputed fact may 
be resolved in a manner adverse to the 
plaintiff only after an evidentiary hearing . . 
. no disputed fact should be resolved against 
[the resisting] party until it has had an 
opportunity to be heard.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Murphy v. Schneider 
Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“To resolve such motions when 
genuine factual issues are raised, it may be 
appropriate for the district court to hold a 
Rule 12(b)(3) motion in abeyance until the 
district court holds an evidentiary hearing on 
the disputed facts. Whether to hold a hearing 
on disputed facts and the scope and method 
of the hearing is within the sound discretion 
of the district court.” (citations omitted)).  
As set forth in detail below, even 
assuming that plaintiff’s facts are true, and 
drawing all inferences in plaintiff’s favor, 
the Court concludes that the contract 
between the parties contains a valid and 
enforceable forum selection clause in which 
plaintiff agreed to litigate the claims in the 
instant lawsuit in the State of California, 
City of Los Angeles. Because plaintiff has 
alleged no facts that would provide grounds 
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to invalidate that forum selection clause, 
discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing on 
this issue is unnecessary.5 
                                                     
5 In other cases, this Court has held evidentiary 
hearings to determine whether a plaintiff assented to 
a forum selection clause in connection with a website 
purchase.  See, e.g., Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Novak v. 
Tucows, Inc., No. 06-CV-1909 (JFB)(ARL), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21269 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007).   
The Court also has carefully considered whether an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary based upon the 
record before it and concludes that such a hearing is 
unwarranted under the particular circumstances in 
this case. As a threshold matter, plaintiff did not 
request an evidentiary hearing and, thus, any such 
request is waived. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC II, 
647 F.3d at 33 (holding that plaintiff had forfeited 
right to any evidentiary hearing on forum selection 
clause by failing to seek it). Second, in order to 
trigger an evidentiary hearing, a party must submit 
evidence creating a genuine issue of disputed fact 
that requires resolution by the Court. Here, as 
discussed infra, defendant has submitted thorough 
evidence – including sworn statements and exhibits 
from the website – demonstrating, inter alia, that 
plaintiff was expressly required to click a specific 
box to accept the Terms of Service (which included 
the forum selection clause) in order to utilize the 
online personals and social introduction services 
available from JDate.com, and plaintiff was required 
to acknowledge her acceptance of the Terms of 
Service each time she submitted credit card 
information to cover monthly subscription fees for 
the website. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence, by 
affidavit or otherwise, to controvert this evidence in 
any way. Instead, plaintiff’s one-page, unsworn 
opposition letter simply states, in a conclusory 
fashion, that plaintiff does not remember what was 
included in the Terms of Service, and speculates 
(without any evidence) that maybe defendant 
amended the terms. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. 
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1 (“I don’t recall the terms of 
service to have been what I signed up with and it 
clearly states that they amend them. I don’t believe 
these are the same terms I signed up with.  I don’t 
believe that I agreed to any terms stating that I have 
to sue within California if an issue arises.”).)  
However, defendant has provided a sworn statement 
from its North American Director of Customer 
Support that the “Terms of Service were applicable to 
all subscribers of Spark Networks’ website at 
B. Section 1404(a) Motions 
Rather than dismiss an action due to the 
existence of a valid and enforceable forum 
selection clause, a court may exercise its 
                                                                                
JDate.com and no material changes were made 
thereto during all four periods where Ms. Zaltz was a 
subscriber of Spark’s website at JDate.com” and the 
forum selection clause at issue was part of those 
Terms of Service and “remained unchanged during 
Ms. Zaltz’s subscription to JDate.com.” (Decl. of 
Steve Burton in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. (“Burton 
Decl.”) ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to 
controvert defendant’s evidence on this issue or any 
other issue, and thus no evidentiary hearing is 
warranted. See TradeComet.com LLC II, 647 F.3d at 
33 (“We conclude . . . that TradeComet failed to raise 
any material issue of fact as to Google’s 
communication of the terms of the August 2006 
agreement that required an evidentiary hearing.”); see 
also Hancock v. Am. Telephone and Telegraph, Inc., 
701 F.3d 1248, 1265 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Because 
Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine factual dispute 
regarding acceptance of the U-verse terms at the 
point of installation, the district court did not err in 
denying an evidentiary hearing.”); Magi XXI, Inc. v. 
Stato Della Citta Del Vaticano, 818 F. Supp. 2d 597, 
610 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Even taking as true all 
facts submitted by plaintiff, and viewing all facts in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds 
that plaintiff has not carried its heavy burden of 
rebutting the presumption of enforceability of the 
forum selection clauses. Thus, it is unnecessary to 
hold an evidentiary hearing.”); Gamayo v. Match.com 
LLC, Nos. C11-00762 SBA, C 11-1076 SBA, C 11-
1206 SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95914, at *21 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (“Since there are no 
factual disputes that bear upon whether the forum 
selection clause should be enforced, Plaintiff’s 
request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.”); 
Universal Grading Serv. v. eBay, Inc., 08-CV-3557 
(CPS), 2009 WL 2029796, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 
2009) (“Accordingly, because there is no dispute that 
persons or entities desiring to become eBay users are 
required to assent to the User Agreement in force at 
the time, and because plaintiff Callandrello  alleges 
that he became an eBay user, and does not dispute 
eBay’s allegation that he became an eBay user in 
2005, when the 2003 User Agreement was in force, I 
conclude without need for an evidentiary hearing that 
the forum selection clause contained in the 2003 User 
Agreement was reasonably communicated to plaintiff 
Callandrello.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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discretionary power to transfer the action 
“[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any 
district or division in which it could have 
been brought,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a). “[M]otions for transfer lie within 
the broad discretion of the district court and 
are determined upon notions of convenience 
and fairness on a case-by-case basis.” In re 
Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 117 
(2d Cir. 1992) (citing Stewart Org., Inc., 487 
U.S. at 29). The burden of demonstrating 
that the action should be transferred to 
another district lies with the moving party, 
D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95 
106 (2d Cir. 2006), and the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum “should not be disturbed unless the 
balance of factors tips decidedly in favor of 
a transfer,” Wildwood Imps. v. M/V Zim 
Shanghai, No. 04-CV-5538, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2736, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 
2005); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (explaining 
that there generally is “a strong presumption 
in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum”).  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Whether Defendant’s Forum Selection 
Clause is Valid and Enforceable 
Defendant’s argument that venue in the 
Eastern District of New York is improper is 
based on the forum selection clause 
contained within the Terms of Service of its 
website, JDate.com. That clause provides 
that all claims arising out of or related to the 
website will be litigated in the state or 
federal courts of California, City of Los 
Angeles. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. 
of Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer (“Def.’s 
Mot.”) at 8.) Defendant contends that 
plaintiff explicitly agreed to be bound by the 
clause because, like all subscribers to the 
website, she was “required to formally 
accept the Terms of Service to become a 
subscriber” and she had to agree to the 
Terms of Service each time she renewed her 
membership. (Id. at 5-6.) As discussed in 
detail below, because the uncontroverted 
evidence demonstrates that defendant’s 
mandatory forum selection clause was 
reasonably communicated to plaintiff, and 
plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of 
showing that enforcement of the clause 
would be either unreasonable or unjust, the 
Court finds defendant’s clause – requiring 
claims to be brought in the State of 
California, City of Los Angeles – to be valid 
and enforceable. 
1. Applicable Law 
Under the standard set forth by the 
Supreme Court in M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., forum selection clauses are 
prima facie valid and should control 
questions of venue absent a “strong 
showing” that enforcement would be 
“unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause 
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or 
over-reaching.” 407 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1972). 
The Supreme Court has also stated that a 
forum selection clause can bind the parties 
even where the agreement in question is a 
form consumer contract that is not subject to 
negotiation. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). 
Forum selection clause language must, 
however, be mandatory to be enforced. John 
Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. 
Attiki Importers & Distribs., 22 F.3d 51, 52-
53 (2d Cir. 1994); Cent. Nat’l Gottesman, 
Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff,” 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 675, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“For a 
forum selection clause to be deemed 
mandatory, jurisdiction and venue must be 
specified with mandatory or exclusive 
language.” (citation omitted)). 
The Second Circuit has developed a 
framework to determine the validity of 
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forum selection clauses in the context of 
motions to dismiss. Under this framework, a 
clause is “presumptively enforceable” if the 
moving party can demonstrate the 
following: (1) the clause was reasonably 
communicated to the party challenging 
enforcement; (2) the clause is mandatory 
rather than permissive in nature; and (3) the 
claims involved are subject to the clause. 
See Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 
378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007). The burden then 
shifts to the non-moving party who, to 
overcome the presumption of enforceability, 
must make a “sufficiently strong showing 
that ‘enforcement would be unreasonable or 
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for 
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.’” Id. 
at 383-84 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 
15); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 
U.S. at 591-92 (finding that plaintiffs failed 
to satisfy the “heavy burden of proof” 
required to invalidate clause for 
“inconvenience”). Whether the resisting 
party has rebutted the presumption of 
enforceability is a question of federal law. 
See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384 (“Despite the 
presumptive validity of choice of law 
clauses, our precedent indicates that federal 
law should be used to determine whether an 
otherwise mandatory and applicable forum 
clause is enforceable under . . . [the final] 
step [] in our analysis.”). 
2. Analysis 
The forum selection clause contained 
within defendant’s Terms of Service on its 
website, JDate.com, provides as follows: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This 
Agreement is governed by the laws 
of the State of California without 
regard to its conflict of law 
provisions. You agree to personal 
jurisdiction by and exclusive venue 
in the state and federal courts of the 
State of California, City of Los 
Angeles with regard to any and all 
claims by you arising out of or 
related to the website. This 
Agreement shall not be governed by 
the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, the application of which is 
hereby expressly excluded. 
(Burton Decl. Ex. A, Terms and Conditions 
of Service, at 8.) In regard to this clause, 
plaintiff states the following: (1) “I don’t 
recall the terms of service to have been what 
I signed up with”; (2) “I don’t believe these 
are the same terms I signed up with”; and 
(3) “I don’t believe that I agreed to any 
terms stating that I have to sue within 
California if an issue arises.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 
1.) The fact that plaintiff cannot remember 
the terms that she was presented with when 
she joined, or that she simply does not 
believe that she agreed to suit in California, 
does not negate the uncontroverted and 
overwhelming evidence demonstrating that 
plaintiff could not have become a member 
of JDate.com without first agreeing to the 
website’s Terms of Service, which included 
the forum selection clause.  
In a declaration in support of defendant’s 
motion to dismiss or transfer, Steve Burton, 
defendant’s Director of Customer Support 
for North America, explained the 
membership process for subscribers of 
JDate.com. In order to join JDate.com, a 
user is required to “click on a specific box to 
accept the Terms of Service. . . . There is a 
check box which the prospective member is 
required to click on confirming that he or 
she has read and agreed to the Terms of 
Service and which features a hyperlink to a 
webpage displaying the Terms of Service.” 
(Burton Decl. ¶ 5.) Those Terms of Service 
include the forum selection clause quoted 
above. (Id. Ex. A, at 8.) In addition, a 
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JDate.com member is required to accept the 
Terms and Conditions of Purchase (which 
incorporate and specifically reference the 
Terms of Service) each time he or she 
submits payment information to cover 
monthly subscription fees. (Id. ¶ 6.)  
Notably, plaintiff does not dispute that 
the process described by Burton was in 
place both when she joined the website and 
each time that she renewed her membership. 
Plaintiff does not even dispute having read 
or agreed to certain terms of service before 
signing up for the website or renewing her 
membership. Instead, plaintiff states in a 
conclusory fashion that she does not 
remember agreeing to, nor does she believe 
that she agreed to, the specific forum 
selection clause that is currently contained 
within defendant’s Terms of Service. 
However, screenshots of the sign-up page 
containing a hyperlink to the website’s 
Terms of Service, which includes the forum 
selection clause (see id. Exs. A, B), and the 
payment page containing hyperlinks to the 
website’s Terms and Conditions of Purchase 
and Supplemental Terms and Conditions of 
Purchase (see id. Ex. C), corroborate the 
process described by Burton. Moreover, 
Burton stated that he reviewed defendant’s 
subscription records, discerned the periods 
of time during which plaintiff was a member 
of the website, and confirmed that no 
material changes to the website’s Terms and 
Services were made during those periods. 
(Id. ¶ 3.) Thus, it is clear that in order to 
have obtained a JDate.com account, and in 
order to have maintained that account 
through various billing cycles, plaintiff 
clicked the box confirming that she had both 
read and agreed to the website’s Terms and 
Conditions of Service (which included the 
California forum selection clause), even 
though she does not recall the specific terms 
at this time. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, 
Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (explaining that declarations filed by 
defendant’s employees, screenshots of 
defendant’s website, and defendant’s current 
website indicate that potential members 
must agree to the website’s terms of service, 
which included a forum selection clause, in 
order to join the site, thereby negating the 
force of plaintiff’s argument that he does not 
remember agreeing to the website’s forum 
selection clause when he joined). 
The Court must next consider whether 
the fact that plaintiff agreed to the Terms of 
Service indicates that defendant’s forum 
selection clause was reasonably 
communicated to her. Several courts across 
the United States have engaged in a 
developing discussion of what conditions 
and actions may manifest one’s assent to 
contractual terms over the Internet. Thus, to 
determine whether defendant’s clause was, 
in fact, reasonably communicated to 
plaintiff, the Court places this case on the 
spectrum of such cases.  
The Second Circuit has held that “a 
consumer’s clicking on a [] button does not 
communicate assent to contractual terms if 
the offer did not make clear to the consumer 
that clicking on the [] button would signify 
assent to those terms.” Specht v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). At issue in 
Specht was an arbitration clause contained in 
license terms on a website that plaintiffs 
allegedly accepted when they downloaded a 
plug-in program from the site. The Second 
Circuit explained that when plaintiffs were 
prompted to download free software from 
the site at the click of a button, they could 
not see a reference to any license terms that 
they would be accepting by clicking. That is 
because the sole reference to any license 
terms was on a screen that the plaintiffs 
could have only seen if they decided to 
scroll down before first acting on the 
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invitation to download. Id. at 31-32. Noting 
that “there is no reason to assume that 
viewers will scroll down to subsequent 
screens simply because screens are there,” 
the Second Circuit concluded that a 
“reference to the existence of license terms 
on a submerged screen is not sufficient to 
place consumers on inquiry or constructive 
notice of those terms,” and that the plaintiffs 
could therefore not be said to have assented 
to defendant’s arbitration clause when they 
clicked to download the site’s plug-in 
program. Id. at 32. However, the Court 
noted that “contracts arising from Internet 
use” have been found in situations where 
there is “much clearer notice than in the 
present case that a user’s act would manifest 
assent to contract terms.” Id. at 33 (citing 
cases).  
Since Specht, courts have found such 
“clearer notice” that Internet user actions 
will amount to contractual assent in cases 
involving conspicuous brosewrap 
agreements and in cases involving clickwrap 
agreements. In a browsewrap agreement, 
‘“website terms and conditions of use are 
posted on the website typically as a 
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”’ 
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (quoting Hines 
v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 
366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). A browsewrap 
agreement “usually involves a disclaimer 
that by visiting the website – something that 
the user has already done – the user agrees 
to the Terms of Use not listed on the site 
itself but available only by clicking a 
hyperslink.” Id. at 837. Several courts have 
enforced browsewrap agreements where the 
circumstances indicated that website users 
‘“must have had actual or constructive 
notice of the site’s terms, and have 
manifested their assent to them,”’ id. at 836 
(quoting Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 
F. Supp. 2d 927, 937-38 (E.D. Va. 2010)), 
i.e., whether the hyperlink to the terms and 
conditions of use was made apparent to the 
average user. A clickwrap agreement, by 
contrast, requires a user to take more 
affirmative action; the user must click an “I 
agree” box after being presented with a list 
of the terms and conditions of use in order to 
receive access to a particular product. See 
Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 
130 n.18 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining the 
difference between clickwrap and 
browsewrap agreements). Forum selection 
clauses contained in clickwrap agreements 
have been enforced by numerous courts 
within this Circuit. See, e.g., Centrifugal 
Force, Inc. v. Softnet Commc’n, Inc., 08 Civ. 
5463 (CM)(GWG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20536, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011); 
TradeComet.com LLC I, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 
377-78; Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 
2d 488, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Novak v. 
Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  
In Fteja v. Facebook, the Southern 
District of New York recently contemplated 
a hybrid of a browsewrap and a clickwrap 
agreement. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829. The court 
described defendant Facebook’s Terms of 
Use as “somewhat like a browseup [sic] 
agreement in that the terms are only visible 
via a hyperlink, but also somewhat like a 
clickwrap agreement in that the user must do 
something else – click ‘Sign Up’ – to assent 
to the hyperlinked terms. Yet, unlike some 
clickwrap agreements, the user can click to 
assent whether or not the user has been 
presented with the terms.” Id. at 838. In 
determining whether Facebook’s Terms of 
Use had been “reasonably communicated” 
to plaintiff, given that consumers were 
required to take further action not only to 
assent to the terms, but also to view them, 
the court considered relevant Supreme Court 
and Second Circuit contract precedent 
outside of the Internet context. The court 
cited Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
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where the Supreme Court upheld a forum 
selection clause on the back of a cruise 
ticket even though the clause became 
binding at the time of purchase, and the 
purchasers only received the actual ticket 
containing the clause later. 499 U.S. 585. 
The court also referenced Effron v. Sun Line 
Cruises, Inc., where the Second Circuit held 
that the forum selection clause contained on 
the back of a ticket bound plaintiffs at the 
moment they accepted their tickets, even 
though they had merely been referred to that 
clause, rather than shown it, in promotional 
materials that they received prior to their 
purchase. 67 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Based on these two non-Internet cases and 
cases where pure browsewrap and pure 
clickwrap agreements over the Internet were 
enforced, the court reasoned that “clicking 
the hyperlinked phrase [on Facebook’s 
website] is the twenty-first century 
equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket. 
In both cases, the consumer is prompted to 
examine terms of sale that are located 
somewhere else.” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 
839. Accordingly, the court held that 
because plaintiff was “informed of the 
consequences of his assenting click and he 
was shown, immediately below, where to 
click to understand those consequences,” 
Facebook’s Terms of Use were “reasonably 
communicated” for purposes of the Bremen 
analysis. Id. at 840 (citing cases).  
The instant case presents circumstances 
that are quite analogous to those in Fteja v. 
Facebook, and the Court strongly agrees 
with the Fteja court’s analysis. Unlike the 
license terms at issue in Specht, defendant’s 
reference to its Terms and Conditions of 
Service appear on the same screen as the 
button a prospective user must click in order 
to move forward in the registration process. 
(See Burton Decl. Ex. B.) Plaintiff did not 
need to scroll or change screens in order to 
be advised of the Terms and Conditions; the 
existence of, and need to accept and consent 
to, the Terms and Conditions of Service was 
readily visible. Moreover, whereas 
Facebook’s Terms of Use were referenced 
below the button a prospective user had to 
click in order to assent, defendant’s 
reference to its Terms and Conditions of 
Service appear above the button (id.), 
thereby making it even more clear that 
prospective members of JDate.com are 
aware that by clicking the button to move 
forward in the registration process, they 
manifest their assent to the Terms and 
Conditions of Service referenced above.  
As to the fact that plaintiff had to click 
on a hyperlink to view the Terms and 
Conditions of Service (rather than view the 
terms on the same page where she had to 
indicate her assent to the terms), the Court 
agrees with the Fteja court’s analogizing 
this situation to cruise tickets – plaintiff was 
shown precisely where to access the Terms 
and Conditions of Service before she agreed 
to them, and should have clicked on them in 
the same way that one is expected to turn 
over a ticket to learn of its terms. Moreover, 
plaintiff was required to take two specific 
actions to assent to JDate.com’s terms: (1) 
check the box next to the statement “I 
confirm that I have read and agreed to the 
Terms and Conditions of Service” (with a 
hyperlink to the Terms and Conditions of 
Service over those words), and (2) click the 
“Accept and Continue” button. (See id.) 
Thus, plaintiff had to essentially “click” to 
denote her acceptance of the Terms and 
Conditions, which contained the forum 
selection clause, twice. In such 
circumstances, “[a] reasonably prudent 
offeree would have noticed the link and 
reviewed the terms before clicking on the 
acknowledgement icon[s].” Fteja, 841 F. 
Supp. 2d at 841 (quoting Guadagno v. 
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E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008)) (alteration in original).6  
In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiff 
assented to JDate.com’s Terms and 
Conditions of Service, meaning that the 
forum selection clause contained therein 
was, in fact, reasonably communicated to 
her. 
As to the second and third steps of the 
Bremen analysis, the Court concludes that 
defendant’s forum selection clause is 
mandatory, and that the claims in this 
lawsuit are subject to the clause. The choice 
of forum is mandatory in this instance 
because specific language regarding venue 
has been included in the clause, specifying 
that “exclusive venue” for all claims is in the 
“state and federal courts of the State of 
California, City of Los Angeles” (Burton 
Decl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Salis 
v. Am. Export Lines, 331 F. App’x 811, 813 
(2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“Whether a 
forum selection clause is mandatory depends 
on its language, and generally courts will not 
                                                     
6 Moreover, the fact that plaintiff had to scroll 
through the Terms and Conditions of Service after 
she clicked on the hyperlink in order to get to the 
provision containing the forum selection clause does 
not affect the Court’s analysis. See, e.g., Scherillo v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313, 322 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that “[a] person who 
checks the box agreeing to the terms and conditions 
of a purchase on an internet site without scrolling 
down to read all of the terms and conditions is in the 
same position as a person who turns to the last page 
of a paper contract and signs it without reading the 
terms,” and thus concluding that “forum selection 
clauses are ‘reasonably communicated’ to a webpage 
user even where a user simply has to scroll down a 
page to read the clause” (citing cases)); Feldman v. 
Google, 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(“That the user would have to scroll through the text 
box of the Agreement to read it in its entirety does 
not defeat notice because there was sufficient notice 
of the Agreement itself and clicking ‘Yes’ constituted 
assent to all of the terms.”). 
enforce a clause that specifies only 
jurisdiction in a designated court without 
any language indicating that the specified 
jurisdiction is exclusive.” (citation omitted)). 
Additionally, the claims in this suit are 
subject to the clause because the clause 
governs “any and all claims by [user] arising 
out of or related to the Websites” (Burton 
Decl. ¶ 4). See, e.g., Salis, 331 F. App’x at 
814 (finding that a clause that, by its terms, 
applied to “[a]ny claim or dispute arising 
under or in connection with” a particular bill 
of lading applied to claims at issue in the 
case, as those claims pertained to the bill).7  
Moreover, plaintiff has not met her 
heavy burden of establishing that the 
enforcement of defendant’s mandatory 
forum selection clause, which was 
reasonably communicated to her, would be 
unreasonable. A clause is unreasonable if: 
(1) its incorporation into the agreement was 
the result of fraud or overreaching; (2) the 
complaining party will be deprived of his 
day in court due to the grave inconvenience 
or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the 
fundamental unfairness of the chosen law 
may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) 
the clause contravenes a strong public policy 
of the forum state. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 
996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing 
M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 15, 18 and 
                                                     
7 Nor is the clause’s application affected by the fact 
that some of plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, and not 
contract, because the viability of those claims depend 
on the contract she entered into with defendant. See 
Bluefire Wireless, Inc. v. CloudNine Comms., No. 09 
Civ. 7268 (HB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119009, at 
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (“[A] forum selection 
clause will also encompass tort claims if the tort 
claims ultimately depend on the existence of a 
contractual relationship between the parties, or if the 
resolution of the claims relates to interpretation of the 
contract, or if the tort claims involve the same 
operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of 
contract.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595-
96). In all of her papers submitted to the 
Court, plaintiff alleges neither that she will 
be deprived of her day in court due to the 
inconvenience of litigating this dispute in 
California, nor that California law would 
divest her of a remedy. In fact, in her 
opposition papers, plaintiff states that she 
“would prefer this case be heard in NY 
state,” but that, “[i]n, the alternative, [sic] 
the venue should be changed.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 
at 1.)  
Similarly, there is no indication or 
credible evidence that defendant’s forum 
selection clause was the result of fraud or 
overreaching, or that its enforcement would 
be against public policy under New York 
law. To the extent that plaintiff suggests in a 
conclusory fashion that she does not believe 
that she agreed to be bound by the forum 
selection clause, this Court has already 
found that plaintiff did, in fact, knowingly 
assent to defendant’s Terms and Conditions 
of Service, which included the forum 
selection clause. As a result, even if plaintiff 
failed to read the terms she agreed to, she is 
nevertheless bound by the forum selection 
clause. See Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch 
Maschinen GMBH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (enforcing forum-selection clause 
where plaintiff had not read the clause prior 
to signing the contract because “it is a 
fundamental principle of contract law that a 
person who signs a contract is presumed to 
know its terms and consents to be bound by 
them”); see also Weingrad v. Telepathy, 
Inc., 05 Civ. 2024 (MBM), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26952, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 
2005) (stating that a party was “bound by 
the terms of the forum selection clause even 
if he did not take the time to read it because 
‘a signatory to a contact [sic] is presumed to 
have read, understood and agreed to be 
bound by all terms, including the forum 
selection clauses, in the documents he or she 
signed.’” (quoting Sun Forest Corp. v. 
Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001))). Plaintiff has therefore failed to 
show that the clause is in any way 
unreasonable. 
In sum, because the Court concludes that 
defendant’s forum selection clause was 
reasonably communicated to plaintiff, is 
mandatory, governs the claims in this 
lawsuit, and is not unreasonable, the clause 
requiring claims to be brought in the State of 
California, City of Los Angeles is valid and 
enforceable. 
B. The Effect of Defendant’s Forum 
Selection Clause 
The effect of defendant’s valid and 
enforceable forum selection clause on the 
fate of this case depends on whether the 
Court treats defendant’s motion as one for 
dismissal or as one for transfer. If the case 
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3), 
the presence of a valid and enforceable 
forum selection clause is determinative. If, 
however, the case should be transferred 
under Section 1404(a), defendant’s forum 
selection clause is merely one factor – albeit, 
a significant one – in the analysis. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Court, in its 
discretion, concludes that transfer pursuant 
to Section 1404(a) is in the interest of 
justice. Accordingly, defendant’s forum 
selection clause factors significantly into the 
transfer analysis, but is not determinative on 
the question of whether the case should, in 
fact, be transferred.   
1. Applicable Law 
When a plaintiff violates a valid forum 
selection clause, either dismissal for 
improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
transfer under Section 1404 is appropriate. 
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“Whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate 
lies within the sound discretion of the 
district court.” Minette v. Time Warner, 997 
F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 
779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The remedy 
chosen determines how much weight is 
given to the existence of a valid and 
enforceable forum selection clause.  
When a party argues that a case should 
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
venue is improper, a valid forum selection 
clause is controlling. See TradeComet.com 
LLC II, 647 F.3d at 476-77 (explaining that 
when a forum selection clause permits suit 
in an alternative federal forum, a court may 
enforce it under Rule 12(b)(3) and dismiss 
the case); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 
19 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the 
Bremen standard controls when “a party 
seeks to have an action dismissed or 
remanded to state court, rather than 
transferred, on the basis of a forum selection 
clause that purports to preclude litigation 
from a venue other than a specific state 
court”). Thus, if a party seeks to enforce a 
valid forum selection clause via a Rule 
12(b)(3) motion, a court may dismiss the 
action. TradeComet.com LLC II, 647 F.3d at 
478 (citing Langley v. Prudential Mortg. 
Capital Co., LLC, 546 F.3d 365, 371 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (Moore, J., concurring)); Phillips 
v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 382 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s 
breach of contract claim through a Rule 
12(b)(3) motion based on a forum selection 
clause).  
Conversely, the presence of a valid 
forum selection clause is but one aspect of a 
court’s analysis of a Section 1404(a) transfer 
motion. See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 
28-31 (“The forum-selection clause, which 
represents the parties’ agreement as to the 
most proper forum, should receive neither 
dispositive consideration . . . nor no 
consideration . . . but rather the 
consideration for which Congress provided 
in § 1404(a).”); Jones, 901 F.2d at 19 
(“[T]he presence of a forum selection clause 
[is] but one factor in the district court’s 
consideration of fairness and convenience 
under section 1404(a).” (citation omitted)); 
Longview Equity Fund, L.P. v. iWorld 
Projects & Sys., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 
6745(RJS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25850, 
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (“Forum 
selection clauses are properly considered as 
an additional factor in a  § 1404 analysis.”). 
Thus, although the existence of a valid 
forum selection clause may be a “significant 
factor” in a court’s determination of whether 
or not to transfer a case pursuant to Section 
1404(a), it is not dispositive; in addition to 
the presence of a valid forum selection 
clause, a court contemplating transfer must 
also consider the other discretionary factors 
related to convenience and the interests of 
justice. See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 
29 (“The presence of a forum-selection 
clause such as the parties entered into in this 
case will be a significant factor that figures 
centrally in the district court’s calculus [in 
deciding a motion to transfer].”); Red Bull 
Assocs. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 
963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The existence of a 
forum selection clause cannot preclude the 
district court’s inquiry into the public policy 
ramifications of transfer decisions.”). 
2. Analysis 
Because defendant has moved to dismiss 
this action or, in the alternative, to transfer 
the case, the effect of defendant’s valid and 
enforceable forum selection clause depends 
on the remedy the Court elects.  
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff, in her 
opposition papers, expresses a preference for 
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transfer, rather than dismissal, in the event 
that the Court concludes that California 
would be a proper venue for this action. (See 
Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) Although defendant has 
expressed a preference for dismissal, it has 
not argued that transfer would be 
inappropriate. Instead, defendant has moved, 
in the alternative, for transfer of this action 
to the Central District of California. 
In addition, given how attentive and 
responsive plaintiff has been in this matter 
thus far, the Court deems it likely that 
plaintiff will simply re-file her claims in 
California if they are dismissed by this 
Court. Courts have found the “extra expense 
and delay required if a case is dismissed 
only to be refiled in another district to justify 
transfer over dismissal.” See, e.g., AJZN, 
Inc. v. Yu, 12-CV-3348-LHK, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2943, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
7, 2013) (citing cases); Rodriguez v. 
PepsiCo Long Term Disability Plan, 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“Dismissal would force Plaintiff to incur 
additional fees and delay by refiling in the 
Southern District of New York. The Court 
therefore concludes that justice is best 
served by transfer, rather than dismissal.” 
(citing cases)). Moreover, it is unclear, from 
the face of the complaint, whether the statute 
of limitations for plaintiff’s claims has run. 
In Minette v. Time Warner, the Second 
Circuit exercised its “statutory and inherent 
authority to transfer” a timely filed 
complaint that the district court had 
dismissed for improper venue, explaining 
that because the statute of limitations had 
run, plaintiff would be unable to have her 
case heard if it was dismissed. 997 F.2d at 
1026-27 (“Given that the functional purpose 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is to eliminate 
impediments to the timely disposition of 
cases and controversies on their merits, the 
transfer of this action, when the statute of 
limitations has run, is in the interest of 
justice.” (internal citation omitted)). But see, 
e.g., Li Kin Wah v. Wu Hak Kong, No. 85 
CIV 4454 (LBS), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3877, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1987) 
(“Several courts have held that an erroneous 
but good faith filing in an improper venue 
will toll the operation of the statute of 
limitations.” (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. 
R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1965))). 
Transferring this case ensures that plaintiff’s 
timely filed complaint will be addressed, 
whereas the claims might otherwise be time 
barred if the case were dismissed. Finally, as 
discussed in detail infra, after conducting 
the transfer analysis required under Section 
1404(a), the Court finds that transferring this 
case would be in the interest of justice. 
For all of these reasons, the Court, in its 
discretion, concludes that transfer, rather 
than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy in 
this instance.8 As a result, the existence of 
defendant’s valid and enforceable forum 
selection clause is but one factor in the 
Court’s Section 1404(a) transfer analysis, 
discussed in detail below.  
A. Transfer Analysis 
To determine whether transferring this 
case would be in the interest of justice, the 
Court must conduct a fact-specific inquiry. 
As discussed supra, the forum selection 
clause is a significant factor in favor of 
transfer, however, “[t]he existence of a 
forum selection clause cannot preclude the 
[Court’s] inquiry into the public policy 
                                                     
8 The Court recognizes that the Second Circuit has 
warned district courts not to “waste judicial resources 
by transferring a case that is clearly doomed.” Daniel 
v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 436 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 
610 (7th Cir. 1999)). However, even if plaintiff’s 
claims might be difficult to sustain, it does not appear 
that they are “clearly doomed.” See, e.g., Person, 456 
F. Supp. 2d at 498.  
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ramifications of the transfer decision[].” Red 
Bull Assocs., 862 F.2d at 967. For the 
reasons discussed in detail below, having 
analyzed the various “other factors relevant 
to whether transfer would promote ‘the 
convenience of parties and witnesses’ and 
‘the interest of justice,’” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 
2d at 841 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), the 
Court concludes that transfer is warranted in 
this instance. 
1. Applicable Law 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice, a district court may 
transfer any civil action to any other district 
or division where it might have been 
brought.” In determining whether to transfer 
venue, courts examine (1) whether the 
action could have been brought in the 
proposed forum, and (2) whether ‘“the 
transfer would promote the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and would be in the 
interests of justice.”’ Clarendon Nat’l Ins. 
Co. v. Pascual, No. 99 Civ. 10840 
(JGK)(AJP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2881, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2000) (quoting 
Coker v. Bank of Am., 984 F. Supp. 757, 764 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). “A motion to transfer 
under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district 
court to weigh in the balance a number of 
case-specific factors.” Stewart Org., Inc., 
487 U.S. at 29. 
‘“Among the factors to be considered in 
determining whether to grant a motion to 
transfer venue are, inter alia: (1) the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the 
convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of 
relevant documents and relative ease of 
access to sources of proof, (4) the 
convenience of parties, (5) the locus of 
operative facts, (6) the availability of 
process to compel the attendance of 
unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative 
means of the parties.”’ Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 
2d at 832 (quoting N.Y. Marine and Gen. 
Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 
102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010)). However, there is 
no strict formula for the application of these 
factors, and no single factor is 
determinative. See, e.g., Hilti 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool 
Corp., 04-CV-629 (ARR)(ASC), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16373, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 
22, 2004). Instead, the factors should be 
applied and weighed in the context of the 
individualized circumstances of the 
particular case. Moreover, the moving party 
has “[t]he burden of establishing the need 
for a change of forum.” Wildwood Imps., 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2736, at *8 (citations 
omitted).  
2. Analysis 
a. Whether This Action Could Have Been 
Brought in the Central District of California 
As a threshold matter, the Court must 
determine whether this action could have 
been brought in the Central District of 
California. Diversity of citizenship forms the 
basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(a) states that, in diversity 
cases, venue is proper in: 
(1) a judicial district where any 
defendant resides, if all defendants 
reside in the same State, 
(2) a judicial district in which a 
substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim 
occurred, or a substantial part of 
property that is the subject of the 
action is situated, or  
(3) a judicial district in which any 
defendant is subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is 
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commenced, if there is no district in 
which the action may otherwise be 
brought. 
Additionally, under Section 1391(c), “a 
defendant that is a corporation shall be 
deemed to reside in any judicial district in 
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at 
the time the action is commenced.” Plaintiff 
does not dispute defendant’s assertion that 
Spark Networks’ principal place of business 
is central California. Therefore, Spark 
Networks, the only defendant in this case, 
“resides” in central California, and the 
Central District of California is a 
permissible venue under § 1391(a)(1) and 
(c). See, e.g., Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. 
Roller Bearing Co. of Am., Inc., 99 Civ. 
9133 (AGS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1623, 
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2001) (“This 
action could have been brought in the 
District of Connecticut because it is 
undisputed that [defendant] has its principal 
place of business in Fairfield, Connecticut. 
Accordingly, the District of Connecticut 
would have personal jurisdiction over 
[defendant] and venue would be proper 
under § 1391(a)(1) and (c) as to all of 
[plaintiff’s] claims.”); Advance Relocation 
& Storage, Inc. v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 
CV 99-2491 (DRH) (MLO), 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19571, at *10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
15, 2000) (“In the instant case, venue in the 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana is proper under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(a)(1) because the judicial district is 
one in which defendant, an Indiana 
corporation with its principal place of 
business in Indiana, resides, and all 
defendants (there being only one) reside in 
the same state, Indiana.”).  
b. Discretionary Factors 
Because this action could have been 
brought in the Central District of California, 
the Court must next determine whether the 
action should be transferred there. As 
discussed supra, the Court has “broad 
discretion” in this determination, and may 
consider a number of factors relating to 
convenience and the interests of justice. See 
D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 106 (“District 
courts have broad discretion in making 
determinations of convenience under 
Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience 
and fairness are considered on a case-by-
case basis.”). As discussed in detail below, 
the Court concludes that these factors, on 
balance, weigh in favor of transfer. 
i. The Forum Selection Clause 
As discussed in detail supra, the Court 
concludes that defendant’s forum selection 
clause – requiring any and all claims arising 
out of or related to JDate.com to be brought 
in the state and federal courts of the State of 
California, City of Los Angeles – is valid 
and enforceable. Thus, that the parties 
agreed that the proper forum for this type of 
action would be either the state or federal 
courts of Los Angeles, California is a 
“significant” factor in the Court’s analysis 
weighing in favor of transfer. See Stewart 
Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 22, 28-31 (explaining 
that although a valid and enforceable forum 
selection clause is but one factor in the 
district court’s Section 1404(a) analysis, it is 
a “significant” one). 
ii. The Locus of Operative Facts 
To ascertain the locus of operative facts, 
courts look to “the site of the events from 
which the claim arises.” See 800-Flowers, 
Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F. 
Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Defendant 
argues that, in this case, “[t]he alleged 
wrongful acts will undoubtedly focus on the 
actions, if any, taken by Spark Networks’ 
employees related to Plaintiff’s JDate.com 
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account and their alleged wrongful conduct 
which led to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.” 
(Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Because Spark 
Networks is headquartered in Los Angeles, 
California, defendant contends that the locus 
of operative facts relevant to the alleged 
wrongful conduct at issue in this case is 
necessarily based in that area. (Id.) The 
Court agrees. 
The individuals who allegedly 
improperly billed plaintiff, and who plaintiff 
allegedly spoke with about her issues with 
the website, work outside of New York.9 
Although plaintiff accessed the site and 
called the Company from her home in New 
York, that fact is not especially relevant to 
defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct. 
Instead, plaintiff’s claims will turn largely 
on what Spark Employees did and what 
motivated their actions. Those employees 
are not located in New York, meaning that 
the individuals from whom depositions will 
likely need to be taken are not situated in 
New York and neither are documents related 
to the actions that they took.  
Moreover, with respect to plaintiff’s 
breach of contract claim in particular, the 
alleged breach occurred outside of New 
York (in California, by Spark Networks 
employees who allegedly improperly billed 
plaintiff). See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 842 
(explaining that although discerning where a 
contract was negotiated or executed and 
where it was to be performed is difficult in 
the case of social networking sites on the 
                                                     
9 Although defendant states that Spark Networks’ 
principal place of business is in Los Angeles, it does 
not indicate whether all employees work at that 
location. However, the Court, taking judicial notice 
of Spark Networks’ website, concludes that all 
employees of the company work outside the State of 
New York. See http://www.spark.net/contact-us-
form/ (indicating that Spark Networks offices are 
located in California, Utah, and Israel).   
Internet, a breach alleged against those who 
maintain such sites must occur where those 
employees work); cf. Everlast World’s 
Boxing Headquarters Corp. v. Ringside, 
Inc., 12 Civ. 5297, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30128, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013) (“In 
a contract case, the locus of operative facts 
is determined by the location where the 
contract was negotiated or executed, where 
the contract was to be performed, and where 
the alleged breach occurred.” (citation 
omitted)). Thus, as between New York and 
California, California is clearly the locus of 
operative facts. See, e.g., Everlast World’s 
Boxing Headquarters Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30128, at *27 (explaining that 
plaintiff’s breach of contract “theory turns 
on business activities among . . . defendants 
that undisputedly occurred in Kansas, not 
New York,” and that the “locus of operative 
facts” factor, therefore, “emphatically favors 
the District of Kansas”); Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 
2d at 841-42 (explaining that employees 
relevant to the claims in the case reside at 
Facebook’s headquarters in Palo Alto, that it 
can be said that the contract that was 
allegedly breached was drafted in Palo Alto, 
and that the alleged breach occurred in Palo 
Alto); Abreu v. Family Shipping & Serv., 
00-CV-0284 (ILG), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5272, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2000) (“The 
operative facts occurred in New Jersey . . . . 
It appears that the only connections to New 
York are that it was the place of initial 
receipt of the [product at issue] and it is the 
plaintiff’s residence.”). 
iii. Convenience of Witnesses 
“The convenience of the forum for 
witnesses is probably considered the single 
most important factor in the analysis of 
whether a transfer should be granted.” Ace 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of the Ozarks, 11 Civ. 
3146 (PGG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110891, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) 
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(citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Wagner v. N.Y. Marriott 
Marquis, 502 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he convenience of 
both party and non-party witnesses is 
probably the single-most important factor in 
the analysis of whether transfer should be 
granted.” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). This factor would generally 
favor transfer because the testimony of 
Spark Networks employees – who work in 
central California and who allegedly 
improperly billed plaintiff and failed to 
adequately respond to her complaints – will 
most likely be the key testimony in the case. 
Moreover, although the Central District of 
California would invariably be more 
inconvenient for plaintiff, “the courts of this 
circuit have emphasized that a forum is not 
necessarily inconvenient because of its 
distance from pertinent parties or places if it 
is readily accessible in a few hours of air 
travel.” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 843 
(quoting Effron, 67 F.3d at 10) (alteration 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
However, the Second Circuit has stated 
that a party seeking to rely on the 
“convenience of witnesses” factor “must 
clearly specify the key witnesses to be called 
and must make a general statement of what 
their testimony will cover.” Factors Etc., 
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (“When a party seeks the transfer 
on account of the convenience of witnesses 
under § 1404(a), he must clearly specify the 
key witnesses to be called and must make a 
general statement of what their testimony 
will cover.”); see also Beatie & Osborn LLP 
v. Patriot Scientific Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 
367, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party moving 
to transfer on the ground that witnesses will 
be inconvenienced is obliged to name the 
witnesses who will be appearing and 
describe their testimony so that the court 
may measure the inconvenience caused by 
locating a lawsuit in a particular forum.” 
(internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). Here, defendant has not identified 
by name or by title any of its potential 
witnesses, nor has it made a general 
statement regarding their anticipated 
testimony. Accordingly, although this factor 
appears to favor defendant, it is not entitled 
to substantial weight. 
iv. Location of Documents 
With respect to the location of 
documents, defendant has stated that 
documents relevant to plaintiff’s claims are 
located at its Los Angeles headquarters. 
(Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Although this factor 
therefore favors transfer, the Court does not 
view it as particularly significant given that 
we live in a technological age, where 
electronic document production has become 
the norm in litigation. See, e.g., Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 12 Civ. 1250 (PKC) (RCE), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 70206, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 
11, 2012) (“Less important in an era of 
electronic documents, easy copying and 
overnight shipping, the location of relevant 
documents and sources of proof nonetheless 
weighs in favor of transfer.” (alteration, 
citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. And 
Indem. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“The location of relevant documents is 
largely a neutral factor in today’s world of 
faxing, scanning, and emailing 
documents.”). Moreover, this factor is not 
entitled to great weight because defendant 
has not indicated that transporting 
documents or other physical evidence from 
California would be particularly 
burdensome. See, e.g., Larew v. Larew, 11 
Civ. 5771 (BSG)(GWG), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2891, at * (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012) 
(“[T]he location of documents is entitled to 
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little weight unless the movant makes a 
detailed showing of the burden it would 
incur absent transfer.” (alteration, citation, 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
v. Convenience of the Parties 
The Court recognizes that “[w]here 
transfer would merely shift the 
inconvenience from one party to the other,’ 
the Court should leave plaintiff’s choice of 
venue undisturbed.” Wagner, 502 F. Supp. 
2d at 316 (quoting Wilshire Credit Corp. v. 
Barrett Capital Mgmt. Corp., 976 F. Supp. 
174, 182 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). However, 
where the parties have agreed upon a forum 
in a forum-selection clause, as the parties 
have done here, the convenience of the 
parties factor generally weighs heavily in 
favor of adjudicating the case in the chosen 
forum. See, e.g., Falconwood Fin. Corp. v. 
Griffin, 838 F. Supp. 836, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (“In a case where the parties have 
already agreed to a particular forum, the 
‘convenience of the parties’ weighs heavily 
in favor of hearing the case in the designated 
court.”); Richardson Greenshields Secs., 
Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 134 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he forum-selection 
clause is determinative as to the convenience 
of the parties.”). Moreover, although 
plaintiff has stated that she would “prefer 
this case be heard in NY State” (Pl.’s Opp’n 
at 1), she has failed to articulate any 
substantial inconvenience by having to 
litigate this case in the Central District of 
California, as opposed to in the Eastern 
District of New York. This factor therefore 
weighs strongly in favor of transfer.  
vi. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 
It is well settled that the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum is “given great weight.” 
D.H. Blair & Co., Inc., 462 F.3d at 107 
(citation omitted). Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s 
choice of venue is entitled to significant 
consideration and will not be disturbed 
unless other factors weigh strongly in favor 
of transfer.” Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. United 
States, 998 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (citations omitted); see also Fteja, 
841 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (“[B]ecause a court’s 
discretion to transfer an action ‘must be 
exercised at the very outset of the case, 
when relatively little is known about how 
the case will develop, courts have typically 
accorded substantial weight to the . . . 
plaintiff’s choice of forum.’” (quoting Atl. 
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 
603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) 
(alteration in original)). However, courts 
have noted that the weight given to this 
factor is significantly diminished where, as 
here, the operative facts did not occur in the 
forum chosen by plaintiff. See, e.g., Capitol 
Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 611 F. 
Supp. 2d 349, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(explaining that the emphasis placed on 
plaintiff’s choice of forum diminishes where 
the operative facts upon which the litigation 
is brought bear little connection to the 
chosen forum); Wagner, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 
317 (“The presumption favoring plaintiff’s 
choice of forum, however, is not so rigidly 
applied where, as here, the cause of action 
arose outside of that forum . . . .” (citation 
and quotation marks omitted)).   
Moreover, plaintiff’s choice of forum in 
filing the lawsuit is not entitled to great 
deference in this case because, as discussed 
supra, there exists a valid and enforceable 
forum selection clause that reflects an 
earlier, contractually agreed upon choice of 
forum by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Boehringer 
Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Merial, Ltd., 
Civ. No. 3:09CV212 (AWT), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6819, at *40 (D. Conn. Jan. 14, 
2010) (“[A]s to the weight accorded the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum, the court 
concludes that this factor weighs heavily 
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against transfer because of the presence of a 
valid and enforceable forum selection 
clause, which the Supreme Court has 
described as a ‘significant factor’ that should 
figure centrally in the court’s analysis.” 
(quoting Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 
29)); Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Wainwright Bank & 
Trust Co., No. 2:08-cv-159, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80167, at *8 (D. Vt. Oct. 9, 2008) 
(“Ordinarily a valid contractual forum 
selection clause will overcome deference to 
a plaintiff’s choice of forum, because it is 
‘treated as a manifestation of the parties’ 
preferences as to a convenient forum.’” 
(quoting Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 
F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995))); Strategic 
Mktg. & Commc’ns, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 41 
F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(“When a § 1404(a) motion involves a 
forum selection clause and the language of 
the clause is mandatory, rather than 
permissive, deference to the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum is inappropriate.”). Thus, 
although plaintiff believes that venue should 
remain in this District, a number of factors 
weigh strongly in favor of transfer – namely, 
the fact that the parties previously chose 
California as the appropriate forum for cases 
like this one through a valid and enforceable 
forum selection clause, and that the locus of 
operative facts is centered in California.  
vii. Relative Means of the Parties 
“Where a disparity exists between the 
means of the parties, such as in the case of 
an individual suing a large corporation, the 
court may consider the relative means of the 
parties in determining where a case should 
proceed.” 800-Flowers, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 
135; see also AIG Fin. Prods. Corp. v. 
Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish 
Cnty., Wash., 675 F. Supp. 2d 354, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In determining whether 
the relative means of the parties weighs in 
favor of transfer, a court should determine 
whether a party’s financial situation would 
meaningfully impede its ability to litigate 
this case in either forum.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
However, ‘“where proof of such disparity is 
not adequately provided, or does not exist, 
this is not a significant factor to be 
considered.”’ Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 844 
(quoting Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. v. Tala 
Bros. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)); see also Neil Bros. Ltd. v. 
World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 
325, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party arguing 
for or against a transfer because of 
inadequate means must offer documentation 
to show that transfer (or lack thereof) would 
be unduly burdensome to his finances.” 
(citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
Plaintiff in this case is proceeding pro 
se, and there appears to be a financial 
disparity between the pro se plaintiff and her 
corporate defendant. However, because 
plaintiff has not provided any “information 
demonstrating that [she] would be 
financially prejudiced by having to litigate 
in California, this factor adds nothing to 
[the] analysis.” Quan v. Computer Scis. 
Corp., CV 06-3927 (CBA)(JO), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1068, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 
2008); see also Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 844 
(“Since the relative economic ability of the 
parties to proceed with a case has rarely 
been a dispositive reason to grant or deny a 
venue change but is instead but one of 
several factors for the court to consider, it 
makes little sense to reject transfer on a 
ground [plaintiff] has not advanced and 
where the Court has no evidence in a case 
where essentially all the other factors weigh 
in favor of transfer.” (alteration, internal 
citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Thus, the relative means factor 
does not tip the scale that, due to all of the 
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other factors mentioned above, strongly 
weighs in favor of transfer. 
*** 
In sum, after carefully considering the 
parties’ submissions and the applicable law, 
the Court concludes, in its discretion, that 
the defendant has met its burden of 
demonstrating that a balancing of the 
transfer analysis factors, as well as the 
totality of the circumstances and the 
interests of justice, warrants transfer of this 
action to the Central District of California. 
Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence or 
persuasive reason as to why transfer would 
be improper. Accordingly, the Court grants 
defendant’s motion to transfer the case.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
denies defendant’s motion to dismiss this 
case and grants defendant’s motion to 
transfer the proceedings. The Clerk of the 
Court is directed to transfer this action to the 
United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).  
 
SO ORDERED.  
 
  
   
______________________ 
  JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
  United States District Judge 
 
Dated: July 8, 2013  
           Central Islip, NY 
 
* * * 
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Defendant is 
represented by David B. Gordon, 
Richardson & Patel LLP, 750 Third Avenue, 
9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017.  
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